A Comprehensive Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction
Source: Goyal, A. & Welch, I. (2008) · Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 1455–1508 · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm014
TL;DR
A systematic out-of-sample test of the variables claimed to predict the equity premium — dividend
yield, earnings/payout ratios, book-to-market, interest rates and spreads, net issuance, cay — finds
that, despite often-strong in-sample fits, **not a single one would have helped a real-world investor
beat the prevailing historical-average benchmark out of sample**, and most would have hurt. A landmark
demonstration that in-sample predictability routinely fails honest OOS evaluation.
The idea
Decades of studies reported in-sample regressions Rₘ(t)−R_f(t) = γ₀ + γ₁·x(t−1) + ε(t) in which various
ratios predict excess returns. Goyal and Welch ask the only question that matters for an investor:
using only data available in real time, would these signals have beaten the prevailing-mean forecast
out of sample? They score forecasts by out-of-sample ΔRMSE / ΔMAE versus the prevailing mean (a
negative number means the predictor underperformed the mean).
Evidence
out-of-sample forecasts typically begin in 1965 (some panels begin forecasts in 1964).
mean** — e.g. at annual frequency the large majority of regressions deliver negative ΔRMSE.
In-sample performance is unstable, often driven by a few episodes (e.g. the 1973–75 oil shock)
and not robust across subperiods; underperformance occasionally reaches ~2–3% per annum.
recover a small but real OOS R² (on the order of ~0.5% per month for some predictors) — enough to
matter for a mean-variance investor.
Why it matters
signal. Use the prevailing mean as the benchmark to beat.
Caveats
NBER w10483 (2004) working paper. Results are about predictability of the market, not about whether
the premium exists.
Key references
Provenance: verified/generated from the paper's full text.
