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On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

Mark M. Carhart

The Journal of Finance · 1997 · 17002 citations

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On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance


Source: Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance 52(1), 57–82 · DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x


TL;DR

Introduces the four-factor model — Fama-French three factors plus a one-year momentum factor (PR1YR/UMD) — and uses it on a survivor-bias-free sample of equity funds (1962–1993) to show that apparent persistence in mutual-fund performance is almost entirely explained by momentum exposure and costs, not skill. Funds holding last year's winners look good until you adjust for the momentum factor; the only persistence the model cannot explain is the strong, persistent underperformance of the worst funds, driven by expenses.


What anomaly it documents

  • Predictor: a fund's prior one-year return predicts its near-term return — the "hot hands" effect of Hendricks, Patel & Zeckhauser (1993).
  • Direction / mechanism: the predictability is mechanical exposure to the Jegadeesh-Titman one-year stock-momentum factor, not stock-picking skill. Funds that did well were accidentally holding momentum winners; individual funds that actually chase momentum earn lower net returns because transaction costs consume the gains.
  • OSAP predictor: momentum (this paper defines the fourth, momentum, factor used throughout performance evaluation).

  • How to construct it

    The four-factor model adds a momentum factor to market, SMB, HML:


  • rᵢ − r_f = αᵢ + bᵢ·RMRF + sᵢ·SMB + hᵢ·HML + pᵢ·PR1YR + eᵢ.
  • PR1YR = equal-weight average of firms in the top 30% of eleven-month returns lagged one month minus the bottom 30%, over all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq stocks, re-formed monthly. (SMB and HML are taken directly from Fama-French.)
  • For the fund test: sort funds each January 1 (1963–1993) into deciles on the prior calendar-year return, equal-weight monthly, then regress decile returns on the four factors; attribute the spread to factor loadings, expenses, and turnover rather than to alpha.

  • Evidence and replication


    ResultMagnitudeSource
    Decile 1−10 spread, raw monthly excess return≈67 bp/month (annualized ≈8%); 24% in the ranking yearthis paper
    of which momentum (PR1YR) explains≈31 bp/month — almost halfthis paper
    CAPM alpha, top vs. bottom decile+22 bp/mo (2.6%/yr) vs. −45 bp/mo (−5.4%/yr)this paper
    4-factor alpha residual spread≈28 bp/mo, of which 20 bp is just decile 9 vs. 10this paper
    Decile-1 best funds' 4-factor alphaessentially zero / does not cover coststhis paper

    Key points:

  • The CAPM cannot explain the decile spread (betas nearly identical across deciles), but the four-factor model absorbs most of it, driven by SMB and especially the pronounced PR1YR loading pattern (top deciles load positively, bottom deciles negatively).
  • Costs matter one-for-one: expenses reduce performance roughly dollar-for-dollar, turnover hurts (≈0.95% of trades), and load funds underperform no-loads by ≈80 bp/year holding expenses constant.
  • The only unexplained persistence is strong underperformance by the worst-return funds — the bottom thirtieth still underperforms T-bills by ≈25 bp/month the following year.
  • Out of sample, the broad conclusion — most fund "skill" is factor exposure and luck — was reinforced by Fama & French (2010).

  • Why it might work

  • Mechanical / factor exposure: "hot hands" is the momentum anomaly leaking through fund holdings, not manager skill.
  • Costs as a persistent drag: expense and transaction-cost differences are sticky, producing genuine persistent underperformance among high-cost funds.
  • Momentum itself remains theoretically unexplained (behavioral underreaction vs. risk).

  • Limitations and risks

  • Attribution depends on the factor model; momentum is not grounded in a risk theory.
  • Measuring whether a fund actually follows momentum is imperfect in the sample.
  • Fund data must be handled carefully for survivorship and look-ahead (this paper's sample is explicitly survivor-bias-free).

  • Key references

  • Carhart, M. (1997) — On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance — Journal of Finance
  • Jegadeesh, N. & Titman, S. (1993) — Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers — Journal of Finance
  • Fama, E. & French, K. (1993) — Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds — Journal of Financial Economics
  • Fama, E. & French, K. (2010) — Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns — Journal of Finance


  • Provenance: verified/generated from the paper's full text.


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